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5Cristina Barés Gómez (Logic, Language and Information Group. 
Sevilla University, Spain)
Negative Evidential Paradigm as a Particular Negation in 
Natural Language
The main goal of this communication is to offer a complete analysis 
of the negative particles la/al in Ugaritic, as an example of negation 
that has a particular behaviour. These particles are two of the four 
negations that we can find in this language. Their behaviour is not 
common in natural language. Indeed, they change from positive to 
negative in modal contexts, conditional, questions, disjunctions, etc. 
Usually, these Ugaritic negations have been studies from a Semitic 
and linguistic points of view and there is no explanation to this 
unusual behaviour. My aim is to provide, not only the linguistic point 
of view, but also the philosophical and logical perspectives. How a 
negation can change from negative to positive depending on the 
context? Are we facing a new non-classical kind of negation? 
In this talk, I will offer an overview of the negative particles from a 
Semitic Linguistic point of view and its relation with what has been 
called asseverative paradigm in Semitic languages. There are different 
6particles with a special behaviour inside the asseverative paradigm, 
but they have never been studied in relation with the negation. I 
analyze several occurrences of these particles on the correspondence 
texts. I choose these texts because they are made to be read aloud. I 
compare these negations with other negations founded in different 
languages and I argue why these kinds of negation do not match with 
Ugaritic negation. We are not facing a metalinguistic negation, 
propositional negation or a polarity item or a scalar negation. 
Thereafter, I will offer a new approach to these la/al particles that 
may explain how they behave. I interpret these negations as a 
negative evidential paradigm and I explain how they change in 
different contexts. For that, I use dynamic epistemic logic with public 
announcement. This is not a classical logical negation, but to grasp it, 
we need to take into account more features. At the end, I open the 
discussion to epistemological problems and how the expression of 
knowledge, or the lack of it, in natural languages might help us to 
understand how the real agents use the knowledge. 
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8Filip Buekens (Tilburg University and University of Leuven)
Saying ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ in informing games and alignment games
I examine the discursive (or dialogical) role of judgements about what 
is funny, agreeable, attractive, followed by an endorsement or a 
rejection. Judgements of taste (their content and the speech acts 
performed when making those judgements) will be explored in the 
context of coordination games. The game theoretical template for a 
public dispute over matters of taste is Battle of the Sexes: in an 
exchange over what is fun (tasty, beautiful), players often seek to 
coordinate their first order values or preferences in view of second 
order preferences that are presupposed and not under dispute. 
Endorsing and rejecting are public signals in an exchange in which 
players seek to reach an equilibrium. 
Speech act theory has always allowed that speakers can perform 
different speech acts simultaneously. In a dispute over matters of 
taste they play two games simultaneously – the game of informing 
others and the alignment of preferences game. These games make 
different propositional contents salient and have different ulterior 
9goals – varying from the creation of bonds to coordination with a 
view to satisfy common interests. When the focus is on the informing 
dimension of judgments of taste, the focus is on an exchange of 
information, which can be modelled as a Trust or Assurance game. 
When playing the informing game, endorsement and rejection make 
little sense, since endorsing what is funny according to the speaker would 
entail, on Gricean grounds, that the contribution to the dialogue was 
not informative at all. That explains intuitions behind expressivism 
about matters of taste, which holds that such statements don’t have 
truth conditions. Endorsing and rejecting, in the context of an 
alignment game, publicly signals agreement c.q. conflict between 
values or preferences. I conclude with a diagnosis of contextualist 
and assessment relativist approaches to predicates of personal taste. 
Contextualists model endorsement and rejection of judgements of 
taste in trust games, while assessment relativists locate the exchange 
in the context of a coordination game. 
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Ciro De Florio (Catholic University, Milan), Massimiliano 
Carrara and Daniele Chiffi (University of Padua)
On Pragmatic Denial
We consider Dalla Pozza and Garola (1995) logical framework for 
pragmatics (LP) where the speech act of assertion and its soundness 
conditions are fomalized. Is it possible to extend LP so to include 
also the speech act of denial? We start from the classical 
equivalence:
(i) v(⊣ A) = J ⇔ v(⊢ ¬A) = J
where ’⊣’ is a symbol for denial. The informal meaning of (i) is 
that it is justified to deny A if and only if it is justified to assert 
¬A. Prima facie, (i) is just a translation, in an extension of LP, of 
the following basic idea: assertion and denial are mutually 
incompatible speech acts. But, in LP, ⊢¬A entails ∼⊢ A where 
the last formula means that there is a proof that A has not been 
proved. So the direction from left to right of (i) does not work: it 
is too strong. One could be justified in rejecting A even if she has 
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not at disposal a proof of ¬A. The converse, instead, holds. If 
there is a proof of ¬A it is rational to deny A:
(i*) v(⊢¬ A) = J ⇒ v(⊣ A) = J.
Moreover, observe that (i) should be taken distinct from (ii):
(ii) v(⊣ A) = J ⇔ v(⊢A) = U
where the informal meaning of (ii) is that it is justified to deny A 
if and only if there is not a proof for the truth of A. Again, (ii) 
does not work too. It is too weak: if there is no conclusive proof 
for A why should I have to deny it? It is commonsensical to 
observe that we use to accept scientific hypotheses without having 
a conclusive proof for them. Intuitively, it seems that a 
characterization of denial of A should be, say, in the middle 
between the proof of ¬A and the absence of a proof for A.
Notice that the reason on the basis of which (i) does not hold can 
be explained by means of an intuitive concept of disproof: whilst a 
proof of A is also a disproof of ¬A, a disproof of A is not always 
a proof of ¬A.
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Our aim is, then, to give a semantic framework to account for this 
asymmetry between proof and disproof. Our starting idea is that:
(iii) for any A, v(⊣ A) = J there exists at least a B which is – in 
some way – incompatible with A.
In the paper we will exploit (iii) with a neighborhood semantics 
(Montague, Scott) where it is possible to define a set D such as for 
any possible world w ∈ W, Dw is the set of incompatible worlds 
with respect to w. We provide a logical framework to characterize 
justification conditions for denial.
Tamara Dobler (University of East Anglia)
Situated Assertion
Since Frege it is common to distinguish two independent elements in 
a statement: its content (thought, proposition) and the force with which 
it is made. Because assertion and question share the same content, it 
is assumed that the assertive or interrogative force are detachable 
from the proposition they assert or question. On this picture, the 
content determines correctness conditions, whilst the force 
determines a currency in which correctness will be measured (truth, 
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response, answer, obedience etc.) The first one to challenge the idea 
that content and force are separable in this way was Wittgenstein in 
Philosophical Investigations. There he made an important point: namely, 
the fact that declarative sentences allow to be paraphrased so that the 
assertion operator (It is asserted) is detached from what is asserted (that 
such and such is the case) does not licence a further claim that we thereby 
perform two distinct acts, entertaining a proposition (which amounts to 
knowing when it would be true) and asserting the proposition 
(assigning it a truth-value). Wittgenstein wants to resist this further 
assumption because, first, he argues that there are countless different 
purposes for which sentences are used besides for asserting, 
questioning or commanding, and, second, a purpose for which a 
sentence is used plays an essential role in understanding its content. So 
it’s misleading to think that content and force are independent in the 
way that Frege suggests.
In this talk I aim to outline a Neo-Wittgensteinian alternative to the 
Fregean picture of assertion based on examples that are in the 
literature known as ‘Travis cases’ (after Charles Travis). These cases 
demonstrate that the same declarative sentence with the same 
(assertive) force when embedded in different scenarios has two 
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different truth-values, so two different sets of truth-conditions. These 
examples have been extensively discussed in the literature on 
contextualism, compositionality, and the semantics-pragmatics 
distinction. However, their impact on the philosophical theory of 
assertion hasn’t been systematically studied. My goal is to show that 
Travis cases offer a new conceptual model of the relation between 
content and force,  where
(i) the former is not ontologically independent of the latter, and (ii) 
the idea of force extends to include wider projects within which 
assertions are made. Furthermore, if content is shaped by force, in 
the way that Travis cases suggest, then this will also have some 
interesting consequences for our understanding of negation and 
disagreement. It has already been observed that, if contextualism is 
correct, then the statements with prima facie contradictory contents 
but made in different contexts, should not be inconsistent (Schiffer 
1996). But speakers judge they are. I argue that this is not because 
speakers are ”semantically blind”, but their intuitions are not 
prompted by proper examples, which is why they draw conclusions 
about content based on formal relations (i.e. that ¬p ∧ p are 
contradictory).
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Marie Duží (VSB-Technical University of Ostrava)
Two kinds of negation and presuppositions
Sentences often come attached with a presupposition that is entailed 
by the positive as well as negated form of a given sentence. Thus if 
the presupposition of a sentence S is not true, the sentence S can be 
neither true nor false. I follow Frege and Strawson in treating survival 
under negation as the most important test for presupposition. 
However, there are two kinds of negation, namely Strawsonian 
narrow-scope and Russellian wide-scope negation. While the former 
is presupposition-preserving, the latter is presupposition-denying. 
This issue has much in common with the difference between topic 
and focus articulation within a sentence. I will show that whereas 
articulating the topic of a sentence activates a presupposition, 
articulating the focus frequently yields merely an entailment. The 
point of departure is that sentences of the form “The F is a G” are 
ambiguous. Their ambiguity stems from different topic-focus 
articulations of such sentences. The point is this. If ‘the F’ is the topic 
phrase then this description occurs extensionally, i.e. with de re 
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supposition, and the Strawsonian analysis appears to be what is 
wanted. On this reading the sentence presupposes the existence of 
the descriptum of ‘the F’. The other option is ‘G’ occurring as topic 
and ‘the F’ as focus. This reading corresponds to Donnellan’s 
attributive use of ‘the F’ and the description occurs intensionally with 
de dicto supposition. On this reading the Russellian analysis gets the 
truth-conditions of the sentence right. The existence of a unique F is 
merely entailed.
From a logical point of view, the two readings differ in the way their 
respective negated form is obtained. Whereas the Strawsonian 
narrow-scope negated form is “The F is not a G”, the Russellian 
wide-scope negated form is “It is not true that the F is a G”. Thus in 
the former case the property of not being a G is ascribed to the 
individual, if any, that is referred to by ‘the F’. On the other hand, in 
the Russellian case the property of not being true is ascribed to the 
whole proposition that the F is a G. I will prove that these two 
readings are not equivalent, because they denote different 
propositions. While “The F is not a G” lacks a truth-value at those 
states of affairs where the F does not exist, the wide-scope negation 
“It is not true that the F is a G” is true at such states of affairs where 
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there is no F. To capture this difference, a logic of partial functions is 
needed. My background theory is Transparent Intensional Logic  
(TIL). TIL is  an  expressive  logic  apt  for  the  analysis  of  
sentences with presuppositions, because within TIL we work with 
partial functions, in particular with propositions with truth-value 
gaps. These features enable me to define a general analytic schema of 
sentences associated with a presupposition, which is another novel 
contribution of this paper.
Pasquale Frascolla (University of Basilicata)
Wittgenstein on Truth and Assertibility: the Role of the 
Disquotational Schema
The paper focuses on the pivotal role played by the Disquotational 
Schema in Wittgenstein’s overall reflection on truth, from the 
Tractatus to the last writings. First, the Schema is shown to be 
derivable from the main semantic and ontological principles of the 
picture theory. Then, by expanding on the later Wittgenstein’s 
remarks that are relevant to the topic, the paper scrutinizes the way 
the Disquotational Schema provides the basis for a description of the 
local practices of making assertions, in which the notion of truth 
18
makes room for that of warranted assertibility as the key-notion. 
Lastly, the issue of how Wright’s Argument from Informational 
Neutrality could be neutralized from Wittgenstein’s viewpoint is dealt 
with.
Matthieu Fontaine (UMR CNRS 8163 «Savoirs, Textes, Langage», 
Lille, France) - Joint work with: Mathieu Beirlaen (Ruhr Universtät 
Bochum, Bochum, Germany)
Inconsistencies and the Use of Negation in an Adaptive 
Dialogical Logic
Paraconsistent logics are logics which do not support explosion. This 
means that even when inconsistencies appear in the process of a 
proof or an argumentation, we cannot infer anything; by relying on 
the Ex Falso Sequitur Quodlibet. Paraconsistent logics are adequate for 
modelling real argumentative practices. It is not unusual, for example, 
to encounter theories which contain inconsistencies and this is not 
always a sufficient reason to give them up [3]. How is it possible to 
adapt the argumentative practices to the apparition of 
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inconsistencies? In this talk, we will propose a study of the use of 
negation in argumentative practices and we will present 
an Inconsistency-Adaptive Dialogical Logic based on a combination of 
some aspects of the paraconsistent dialogical logic of Rahman & 
Carnielli [4] and the adaptive logic framework of Batens [1, 2]. In 
bringing these frameworks closer together, we obtain a very powerful 
mechanism for the systematic study of dialogues in which two parties 
exchange arguments over a central claim, in the possible presence of 
inconsistencies.
In dialogical logic, a proof is conceived in terms of argumentative 
game; i.e. in terms of an argumentative interaction between the 
proponent of a thesis and an opponent to that thesis. Dialogues are 
defined according to two kinds of rules: the local rules give the 
meaning of the connectives in terms of attack and defence; the 
structural rules define the general organization of a dialogue. The 
dialogical pluralism is grasped at the structural level: by changing the 
structural rules, we define various different logics. Whereas dialogical 
logic has often been claimed to be a dynamic approach to 
argumentation by the dialogicians themselves, dialogical logic has 
often been defined in a monotonic way, without allowing any real 
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dynamicity with respect to the application of the rules. By combining 
dialogical logic with some aspects of adaptive logics, we aim at giving 
an actual dynamic turn to dialogical logic; in particular with respect to 
the application of the rule for the negation. Indeed, in the Inconsistency-
Adaptive Dialogical Logic we will present, the negation can be attacked 
by some specific “conditional moves” the success of which depends 
on the context of argumentation and the (in-)consistent behaviour of 
the formulas at stake in the game. Such behaviour is usually 
determined in adaptive logic in relation to a presupposed set of 
abnormalities. The sharp distinction of the local, structural and 
strategic level in dialogical logic renders possible an adaptive logic 
without any presupposition of a set of abnormalities.
[1] Diderik Batens. 2000. «A survey of inconsistency-adaptive logics». 
In Batens, Priest, and Van Bendegem (eds), Frontiers of Paraconsistent 
Logic. Baldock: Research Studies Press, King’s College Publications: 
49-73.
[2] Diderik Batens. 2007. «A universal logic approach to adaptive 
logics». Logica Universalis: 1: 221-242. 
[3] Joke Meheus. 2002. Inconsistency in Science. Springer.
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[4] Sahid Rahman and Walter Carnielli. 2000. « The dialogical 
approach to paraconsistency ». Synthese, 125(1-2):201-232.
Aldo Frigerio (Catholic University, Milan)
The meaning of negation in natural languages
The aim of my talk is to illustrate the manifold uses of negation in 
natural languages. Of course, negation can target the propositional 
content of a sentence or part of the propositional content (as the 
scope relations demonstrate). However, it can target also any other 
aspect of what is communicated by an utterance of a sentence in a 
context: linguistic acts, conventional implicatures, presuppositions, 
conversational implicatures, secondary aspects of meaning and even 
pronunciation. After having rejecting the hypothesis that negation is 
ambiguous in natural languages, an attempt to characterize what these 
uses have in common will be made. The basic idea is that, by using a 
negation sign, the speaker expresses her refusal against some aspect 
of the sentence meaning or form. 
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Alessandro Giordani (Catholic University of Milan)
An Epistemic Theory of Conditioned Rejection
A common view on the connections between rejection, denial and 
negation is modeled according to the following equivalence theses:
ET1: denying = asserting a negation
ET2: rejecting = assenting to a negation
Furthermore, assuming that in asserting we express assent, denying is 
identified with expressing dissent, which is in turn identified with 
assent to a negation. Finally, assuming that assenting is the epistemic 
act corresponding to the epistemic state of belief, asserting is 
identified with manifesting a belief, while denying is identified with 
manifesting a belief in a negation.
In this paper I am going to present an analysis of rejection by 
building on explicit epistemic logic. The general result is that rejection 
is not to be identified with believing in the negation of a proposition, 
but with a frame-dependent epistemic act, where a frame for an 
epistemic act is assumed to consist of a pair (,T), where
  is a set of subject matters
23
 T is a set of reference theories
The basic intuition underlying such an approach is that the explicit 
form of assent is to be construed as saying that there is a justifier, 
more precisely a subjective sufficient justifier constructed in a theory 
TiT, for asserting a proposition  as a solution to a specific 
problem relative to subject matter . Correspondingly, the explicit 
form of a rejection is to be construed as saying that there is a justifier 
in a theory TjT, not necessarily coincident with Ti, for concluding 
that it is absurd to assume that  is a solution to that problem relative 
to the same subject matter. Hence, assent and rejection are conceived 
as conditioned by a subject matter and constrained by a theory, so 
that, as we will see, a change in subject matter might induce a 
corresponding change in the epistemic act and a change in the 
reference theory might induce a change in the act even relative to the 
same subject matter.
In modeling this kind of states, I will extend the usual systems of 
epistemic logic in two directions: (i) by introducing a partition of the 
epistemic space into cells, corresponding to different conceptual 
frames determined by pairs (,T) of theories and subject matters; (ii) 
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by making explicit the reference to justifiers, corresponding to 
elements of justification for asserting propositions. The first step 
allows us to introduce a local approach to the epistemic space, thus 
generalizing the standard global approach. The second step allows us 
to generalize the constructive approach according to which 
assertibility has to be intended as having a procedure to obtain a 
proof of a proposition.
As we will see, the resulting system is extremely powerful from an 
analytical point of view. In particular, within the system, it is possible 
both to provide an intuitive interpretation of the phenomena of para-
completeness and para-consistency connected to rejection and to 
assume an intermediate standpoint on the problem as to whether 
rejection is to be intended as having a proof of the negation of a 
proposition or rather as not having a proof of the proposition.
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Bjørn Jespersen (University of Barcelona)
Iterated Privation
What is the logic of iterated privation as expressed by, for 
instance, ‘is a molten fake gun’? This talk motivates the thesis that 
the logic of iterated privation is a logic of contraries. 
The received rule for privative modifiers replaces the modifier Mp by 
boolean negation:
[Mp F]wt x
 single privation 
 Fwt x
where Fwt is the extension of F at the world, time of evaluation. This 
rule fails to generalize to iterated privation. The suggested rule of 
iterated privation is this:
26
[Mp [Mp F]]wt x
 iterated privation
[Non [Mp F]]wt x
Non is the unique general privative modifier that takes a property G 
to the general contrary property Non G. Contrariety provides the 
weaker form of negation that is suitable for privatives. Some 
instances of iterated privation return the basic property F, others do 
not. 
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Tim Kraft (Universität Regensburg)
Conceptual Analysis, Necessary Conditions and the Distinction 
between Rejection and Denial
According to common philosophical methodology (dating back at 
least to Socrates), philosophical debates about some topic F should 
begin with clarifying what Fs are before addressing more substantial 
questions including the question of whether Fs actually exist or are 
even possible. For example, before debating whether knowledge, 
freedom of the will or universals possibly exist(s) we should agree on 
what knowledge, freedom of the will or universals are supposed to 
be. Alternatively, if full conceptual analyses are unavailable we should 
agree at least on necessary conditions for being an F. Again, to give 
examples, before debating whether freedom of the will is possible we 
should at least agree on whether the ability to do otherwise is a 
necessary condition on freedom and before debating whether 
knowledge is possible we should at least agree on whether infallibility 
is a necessary condition on knowledge. In a nutshell, debates about 
necessary conditions precede substantial debates, including 
existence/possibility debates.
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This paper discusses a challenge to this common methodological 
assumption by focusing on what it means to say ‘no’ to a necessary 
condition. The challenge I have in mind runs as follows: Roughly, 
that condition C is necessary for being an F means that: 
(NC) Necessarily for all x if Fx, then Cx. 
Denying an instance of (NC), i.e. asserting the negation of an instance 
of (NC), entails that Fs are at least possible. However, this is not how 
debates about necessary conditions are usually understood in 
philosophy. Since opposition to a necessary condition for being an F 
is rarely understood as a commitment to the possibility of Fs, 
opposition to a necessary condition can’t consist in denying an 
instance of (NC). For example, opposition to infallibilism
(IF) If S knows that P, it is impossible that S believes that P (on the 
same basis) and it's false that P. 
Isn’t taken to come with a commitment to anti-scepticism. It should 
be possible to say ‘no’ to infallibilism without being thereby 
committed to anti-scepticism, i..e., fallibilism and scepticism should 
be consistent. Thus, common philosophical methodology faces the 
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challenge to explain what opposition to a necessary condition is 
supposed to be if it's not denial. 
To meet this challenge I discuss some proposals (labelled the ‘verbal 
dispute account’, the ‘impossible worlds account’ and the ‘suspension 
of judgement account’ in the paper) before presenting my own 
proposal. It consists in distinguishing between two negative doxastic 
attitudes, denial (= accepting the negation) and rejection (= negative 
attitude weaker than denial). According to this proposal, rejection of 
a necessary condition is a complex doxastic attitude consisting of, on 
the one hand, withholding belief on the possibility of Fs and of, on 
the other hand, a conditional belief conditional on the possibility of 
Fs (akin to, e.g., conditional promises). (Rejection is a complex 
attitude in the same way hope is, presumably, a complex 
propositional attitude consisting both of a pro-attitude and a doxastic 
attitude.) This proposal has at least two advantages: First, it doesn’t 
require logical or semantic revision; it’s consistent with classical logic. 
Second, it offers an explanation of why opposition to a necessary 
condition is stronger than mere non-acceptance or merely suspending 
judgement. Thus, it can explain common philosophical practice, for 
example, why fallibilists don’t merely suspend judgement on (IF), but 
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indeed say ‘no’ to it. Finally, I also respond to two objections, namely, 
first, that my account of rejection is ad hoc and can’t be turned into a 
general account of rejection and, second, that it’s unnecessarily 
revisionary insofar as it postulates additional mental states. 
Nils Kürbis (Birkbeck, London) 
Bilateralist Detours: From Intutionist to Classical Logic and 
Back
The standard view is that adopting a primitive notion of denial in 
addition to a primitive notion of assertion, thereby doubling up 
pragmatic primitives in terms of which the contents of sentences is 
specified on the basis of speakers’ use, allows for a neat justification 
of classical logic. Huw Price has proposed the position in order to 
answer Dummett’s challenge of providing a satisfactory, use-based 
theory of sense that justifies classical logic. It has been developed into 
a formal theory, emulating Dummett’s proof-theoretic semantics with 
its aim of a justification of deduction, by Ian Rumfitt. Price argues 
informally that there is no room between the assertion of a sentences 
and the denial of its negation, which would be needed for an 
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intuitionist concept of negation. Rumfitt develops a formal system of 
bilateral logic and argues that the rules governing classical negation in 
a bilateral logic are in harmony, where those for intuitionist negation 
are not.
I argue that, ironically, Price’s account goes better with an intuitionist 
back ground logic. I regiment Price’s account by formulating axioms 
that capture the concepts Price employs in his argument that 
bilateralism justifies classical logic. Price proposes a pragmatic 
account of belief in terms of the differences they make to speakers’ 
actions. It turns out that the axioms entail consequences about the 
notion of making a difference that Price can’t accept: if classical logic 
is correct, the notion is either vacuous or highly problematic. I show 
how a small modification insures that the notion of making a 
difference regains its interest. The theory is then, however, best seen 
as intuitionist, and classical logic cannot be established on the basis of 
it. Even if Price extended his account, this would only show that the 
classical and intuitionist alternatives are both available, and not what 
Price had intended to show, namely that his theory must be classical.
Rumfitt poses the intuitionist a challenge: to provide a bilateral 
account of intuitionist logic in which the rules of the system are in 
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harmony. I do exactly that and formalise an intuitionist bilateral logic 
where all connectives are governed by harmonious rules, showing 
Rumfitt’s claim that only classical, but not intuitionist logic, can be 
justified bilaterally to be wrong. Thus Rumfitt’s challenge is met. 
Harmonious rules for an intuitionist bilateral logic can be formulated 
by making fuller use than Rumfitt himself does of the possibilities 
offered by the formal framework of bilateral logics.
Thus Price’s and Rumfitt’s approaches both fail to justify classical 
logic as the unique logic. What is more, putting both together, I will 
argue that Price’s informal account is captured by my formal system 
of bilateral intuitionist logic.
Finally, Price and Rumfitt agree that for methodological reasons, 
bilateralism is to be preferred over unilaterlism only if classical logic 
can be justified relative to it. As I show that intuitionist logic can 
equally be justified bilaterally, I conclude that the clumsy bilateralist 
approach has no methodological advantage over the simpler, more 
straightforward unilateralist approach.
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Vittorio Morato (University of Padua)
Denials of Counterfactuals
According to D. Lewis (1973), would-counterfactuals (□→) and 
might-counterfactuals (⋄→) are duals:
(1) φ □→ψ ≡ ¬(φ ⋄→¬ψ)
From 1 (usually called “duality thesis”) it follows that the negation 
of a would-counterfactual is the assertion of a might 
counterfactual with a negated consequent:
(2) ¬(φ □→ψ) ≡ φ ⋄→¬ψ
and the negation of a might-counterfactual is the assertion of a 
would-counterfactual with a negated consequent:
(3) ¬(φ ⋄→ψ) ≡ φ □→¬ψ.
The problem with 2 and 3 is that there seems to be perfectly 
plausible cases where I can both assert φ □→ψ and φ ⋄→ ¬ψ or    
φ ⋄→ ψ and φ □→ ¬ψ. For example, asserting a conditional like:
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(4)      If I would have arrived at the gate just 5 minutes later, I  
          would have lost my connection flight to Boston  
seems perfectly compatible with the assertion of the following 
might-not conditional:
(5) If I would have arrived at the gate 5 minutes later, I might 
            not have lost my connection flight to  Boston. 
It is perfectly reasonable in fact that, while those five minutes 
actually secured my catching the connection flight, it is not the 
case that there were no possibilities for me to catch my 
connection flight and so, even arriving 5 minutes late, I might 
have, after all, been able to catch my connection and so I might 
not have lost it. But a might-not-counterfactual of the form          
φ ⋄→ ¬ψ is predicted by 2 (and ultimately by the duality thesis) to 
be the negation of a counterfactual like φ□→φ. Thus, standard 
Lewisian semantics seems to be giving us the wrong predictions 
about denials of counterfactuals.
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Aim of my paper is to disentangle this situation. In particular, I 
will claim that a thesis like 1 misses the target in at least two ways. 
On the one hand, based on some considerations of R. Stalnaker 
(1984) and K. DeRose (1991), I will defend the view that might-
counterfactual often receive an epistemic interpretation: in such 
cases, the assertion of a might-not counterfactual cannot act as the 
denial of a would-counterfactual in that the former asserts the 
compatibility of a certain would-counterfactual with the speaker’s 
knowledge. On the other hand, I will defend the view that the way 
in which we deny counterfactuals is stronger than a simple 
sentential negation of a counterfactual. This latter claim will be 
connected with recent debates that treats negation as some kind of 
modality operator (such as Berto 2015).
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Antonio Piccolomini d’Aragona (Aix-Marseille Université, 
Università “La Sapienza” di Roma)
Recognition procedures and Dag Prawitz’s theory of grounds
According to a widespread proposal, the meaning of the logical 
constants should be explained through an epistemic notion 
accounting for evidence. The main development of such an idea, 
the BHK-semantics, dates back to the intuitionistic tradition. The 
burden is here put on proofs, generally coded by constructions of 
a typed and extended λ-calculus. Some authors have however 
questioned the BHK-clause for implication, namely the idea that a 
proof of A → B is an effective operation that always yields a 
proof of B whenever applied to a proof of A. An effective 
operation could in fact be highly complex, so that being in 
possession of it could amount to know how to obtain a proof 
from a proof, but not also to know that it behaves in the way 
required. In the first part of my talk, I will discuss the position of 
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Dag Prawitz on this topic; in the second, I will investigate some 
aspects of his approach within his recent theory of grounds.
Prawitz’s proofs are endowed with functions denoting the 
recognition that evidence has been obtained. In the implicational 
case, the recognition must presuppose an  understanding that an 
effective operation transforms proofs into proofs. For closed λ-
calculi, this understanding is available and mechanical. Because of 
Gödel’s theorems, anyway, no closed λ-calculus generates all the 
effective operations one needs. The  linguistic context has then to 
be open, so that mechanical understandings are ruled out.  
Therefore, there remain only two options: either the 
understanding indicates case-by-case strategies, or it is a uniform – 
though non-mechanical – procedure. This leads to different ways 
to frame the question of whether every effective operation can be  
understood as transforming proofs into proofs. The case-by-case 
picture is reasonable, while arguments can be raised against the 
idea of a uniform procedure.
The theory of grounds involves a decidability problem that closely 
recalls these issues.  Ground-terms are typed on formulae of a 
background language, and the question is now whether it is 
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decidable that an effective operation yields a ground of a specific 
type when applied to grounds in its domain. I will try to show 
that, from a ground-theoretic point of view, understanding 
procedures play the role of higher order operations. This is 
attained in three steps.
1. Prawitz’s language of grounds G(L) for a first-order 
background language L is introduced.
2. G(L) is expanded via quantification over ground variables 
– which allows to formalize meta-formulae of the kind 
“the effective operation f always yields a ground of type B 
when applied to grounds of type A1, …, An”.
3. A language of grounds G(G(L)) for the background 
language G(L) is proposed, with terms typed on equations 
between ground-terms – which allows to take higher-order 
operations as constructions for the meta-formulae above.
Within this framework, it will also be possible to see that the 
epistemic problems posed by effective operations again lurk out in 
connection with higher order operations, and that the 
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understanding procedures always involve higher order operations 
to solve equations between ground-terms.
Giuseppe Primiero (Middlesex University, London)
Assertion by Trust. Negation by Untrust
Applications in computational domains complement verified 
knowledge with information sharing processes based on reputation 
models. From a logical viewpoint, formulating assertion operations in 
terms of a trust function is a great conceptual and technical challenge, 
as this is a fluid epistemic notion. Moreover, its complementary 
notion of untrust has a complex semantics, for which one needs to 
pin down the difference between distrust and mistrust. We overview 
a proof-theoretical approach to trust introduced in [Primiero, 
Raimondi (2014)] and applied to the problem of software 
management systems in [Boender, Primiero, Raimondi (2015)]. We 
extend here further its analysis to a notion of (un)trust based on a 
security protocol taking into account an intentional reading of data 
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and typing. We consider, moreover, the problem of untrust 
multiplication generating enemy mine situations. 
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Fabien Schang (National Research University, Higher School of 
Economics, Moscow)
Epistemic disagreements
I propose a formal framework for social epistemology, in which a 
number of various sorts of agents may obey alternative sets of 
acceptance and rejection conditions on sentences. The talk consists 
of two main parts.
 
After making a difference between information and justification, I 
propose two sorts of logical systems within a common dialogical 
framework ARmn of question-answer games. The first system, AR4, is 
a four-valued logic of information analogous to Belnap’s FDE, with 
the notable exception that it includes a strong version of implication 
and depicts logical values as structured pairs of yes-no answers. The 
second system, AR4, is a logic of justification including at least four 
belief unary and truth-functional operators on justification sentences. 
A taxonomy of several kinds of agents is suggested, namely: rational, 
irrational, and intelligible agents. By this way, I construct a formal 
epistemology that develops some problem raised by Martin Kusch’s 
works (on the relations between pluralism, skepticism, and relativism) 
whilst relying upon two fundamental data: yes-, and no-answers. 
42
Then the notions of agreement and disagreement between agents are 
reviewed in the light of two basic concepts: negation, and opposition. 
On the one hand, the occurrence of partial or total (dis)agreements 
makes room for a distinction between (full) negation and two semi-
negations. On the other hand, oppositions are then defined not as a 
relation between ontic truth-values but, rather, epistemic attitudes of 
agreement or disagreement. This results in a more fine-grained theory 
where any two agents can stand into different relations of opposition 
with respect to the same sentence. These ensuing, “non-standard” 
oppositions correspond to pairs X,Y of standard, Aristotelian 
oppositions X and Y. 
To conclude, a number of philosophical applications will be exposed 
to make sense of such issues as partial or complete disagreement.
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Martin Stokhof (ILLC - University of Amsterdam)
Assertion and Non-Discursive Content
The talk focusses on the  phenomenon of non-discursive content, 
i.e., content that is ineffable, yet more than expressive; subjective, yet 
intersubjectively shareable; and world-related, yet action-guiding (and 
hence normative). We will give a brief sketch of a number of areas 
where such a notion of non-discursive content appears to play a role 
(aesthetics, religion, certainty). Then we will  turn to the main issue, 
which is this:  If non-discursive content really is “content”, then it 
seems it must have some relationship with assertion. One reason to 
think so is this. To the extent that non-discursive content  is action-
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guiding it must have the ability to convince (to function in a decision-
process, etc). At this point, it seems, there must be some kind of 
connection with assertion and assertive content. But then we are 
confronted with a number of difficult questions: What is the 
connection? Can we account for it without reducing non-discursive 
content to assertive content? Or can we only escape the threat of 
reduction by going expressivist, and thereby give up on the idea of 
non-discursive content? These are notoriously difficult problems, and 
we will certainly not be able to come up with definite solutions.  But 
we want to explore  this “Thin Red Line between Expressivism and 
Assertivism” a bit further and see what room there is to approach 
these issues in a non-reductive, positive manner.
James Trafford (UCA, London)
An Interactive Approach to Proof-Theoretic Semantics
In model-theoretic semantics for propositional logics, categoricity 
and compositionality are unproblematic whenever the semantics is 
truth-functional. This is not the case for proof-theoretic semantics, 
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where failures of both occur for the semantics determined by 
monological entailment structures for classical and intuitionistic logic. 
 This is problematic for inferentialists, where the meaning of logical 
constants is supposed to be determined by their rules. Recent 
attempts to overcome these issues have primarily considered 
symmetric entailment structures, but these present difficulties for 
constructing a semantics based on proofs. Nonetheless, the reason 
that symmetric entailment structures overcome issues facing 
monological structures is, arguably, that they can refute problematic 
cases. This paper builds on this by considering entailment structures 
that combine provability with the dual notion of disproof (or 
refutation). This enables us to get proofs and counter-models (as 
refutations) on the same ground, as non-interdefinable, and forming a 
disjoint class. To do so, we effectively split the symmetric structure in 
two, formalizing a dialogue structure between the roles of prover and 
denier in a polarized form of bi-intuitionistic logic. We make this 
intuitive by considering a dialogical approach to proof and refutation. 
Arguably, the making of an assertion brings with it a commitment, 
not to its truth, but to defend its truth. That is to say, assertoric 
norms do not restrict what an agent ought to assert, rather they 
constrain how agents respond to challenge and dialogue. On this 
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view, making an assertion (we may think symmetrically for denial) is a 
matter of bringing that assertion into “play”, at which point, it is 
subject to norms involving a commitment to its defense, to providing 
reasons for it, and allowing it to be “tested” through interaction with 
other reasons, counterexamples and so on. It is this interaction that 
will be shown to be constitutive of a proof-theoretic semantics 
capable of dealing with the above issues.
Luca Tranchini (Tübingen University)
Proof and refutations in bi-intuitionistic logic: A critical 
assessment
Whereas the meaning of logical constants in intuitionistic logic is 
understood in terms of proof-conditions, in dual-intuitionistic logic it 
is understood in terms of refutation-conditions. Likewise, logical 
consequence is analysed as transmission of provability in one case 
and as (backward-)trasmission of refutability in the other. 
How can these two conceptions of meaning and consequence be 
brought together? 
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One may be tempted to answer that bi-intuitionistic logic offers the 
natural framework for the rejection of the transmission view of 
consequence in favour of a conception of consequence as a primitive 
and irreducible notion to which both proofs and refutations should 
be reduced as limit cases. 
However, we argue that such a view is not tenable, at least if the 
resulting notions of proof and refutations aim at providing the basis 
for an anti-realist characterization of truth and falsity. The reason for 
this the fact that identity of proof (and of refutation) in bi-
intuitionistic logic is trivial.
As an alternative we consider the possibility of bringing proofs and 
refutations together by using a strong negation operator. In 
particular, we show that strong negation allows one to simulate dual-
intuitionistic refutations in the intuitionistic setting and, dually, 
intuitionistic proofs in the dual-intuitionistic setting.
Whether in this way proofs and refutations are really brought 
together is however doubtful. In fact, although either proofs or 
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refutations are mimicked by their duals, the two concepts are still not 
treated on a par.
I will conclude the talk by sketching a further possibility of bringing 
proofs and refutations together inspired by the translation of bi-
intuitionistic logic in the richer linear logic setting. In particular, I will 
suggest that such an approach offers the prospects of overcoming the 
shortcomings of the previously considered attempts.
Pasi Valtonen (King’s College)
The Meaning of Absurdity: A Comment on Murzi and 
Hjortland’s Solution to Carnap’s Problem
1 Introduction
The dispute between inferentialist and model-theoretic approach to 
meaning can be seen as dispute about the direction of explanation: 
Referentialism relies on the referential semantics which is then used 
to explain the inferential rules for the language. Whereas, 
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inferentialism starts off with inferential rules which are then used to 
explain semantics.
According to Panu Raatikainen, inferentialism cannot solve the so-
called Carnap’s problem, unlike its model-theoretic  rival.
(NEG) ¬A is true  ⇐⇒  A is false
is an essential principle for negation in both classical and intuitionistic 
logic. Carnap has shown a non-normal model which violates this 
principle: For any sentence A, both A and ¬A are true. According to 
Raatikainen, this valuation poses a serious problem for inferentialism: 
The standard rules of inference do not rule out the non-normal 
interpretation which violates NEG.
2 Murzi and Hjortland’s  solution
First, I examine Julien Murzi and Ole Thomassen Hjortland’s (M&H 
from now on) solution in detail. In their reply to Raatikainen, M&H 
claim that intuitionistic inferentialists can handle the problem. Their 
claim rests on three assumptions: (i) Absurdity sign (⊥) stands for 
contradictory propositional content. (ii) The introduction rule for ⊥ is 
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null and the elimination rule is so-called absurdity rule which states that 
from ⊥ anything follows. Finally, (iii) their solution satisfies the 
harmony constraint. Briefly, the constraint says that the conditions 
for the introduction of ⊥ (or any other logical connective) must 
match the consequences when ⊥ (or any other connective) is 
eliminated. I demonstrate that the view faces a dilemma: Either 
Carnap’s problem is solved but harmony of the rules for ⊥ is lost or 
harmony is saved at the cost of losing the solution to the problem.
My alternative proposal rests on relevantism. In contrast to M&H’s 
view, relevantism does not attribute propositional content to ⊥. 
Rather, it sees ⊥ more like a punctuation sign, marking a dead-end in 
an inference. Viewed in this way, ⊥ has no introduction or 
elimination rules. Thus, harmony is not a question and relevantism 
escapes the dilemma presented above.
3 Carnap’s problem and  Bilateralism
M&H remain sceptical whether Ian Rumfitt’s classical bilateralism 
can solve the problem. In the second part of the talk, I go on to show 
that the proposed view not only solves the exposed problems in the 
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intuitionistic solution but also contributes to the classical inferentialist 
solution.
Unlike unilateralism, bilateralism recognises in addition to assertion 
also an act of rejection. Given this, the bilateral introduction and 
elimination rules for negation yields the classical rule of the law of 
excluded middle in a harmonious way.
Contra M&H, it is my contention that Rumfitt’s bilateralism can solve 
Carnap’s problem with the help of so-called coordination principle. 
Briefly, let + A stand for assertion of A and – A for rejection of A, 
then the coordinated bilateral introduction and elimination rules 
allow to form
+ A, – A ⊢ ⊥  ⇐⇒  + A, + (¬A) ⊢ ⊥.
which in effect rules out the situation where A is assertible and ¬A is 
assertible. Thus, the coordinated bilateral rules for negation do 
provide a solution to Carnap’s problem. Furthermore, I show that the 
proposed solution is based on relevantism.
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Heinrich Wansing (Ruhr-Universität, Bochum)
Negation, denial, and inference
In this talk I intend to discuss Frege’s distinction between the content 
and the force of speech acts and what David Ripley (2011) has called 
denial equivalence, “the thesis that to assert the negation of a content 
A is equivalent, in its conversational effects and commitments 
carried, to denying A.” Moreover, I will discuss Ian Rumfitt’s  (2000) 
bilateral conception of specifying the meaning (or sense) of 
sentences. Whilst I agree with Rumfitt that both conditions for 
affirming and conditions for denying are relevant for specifying the 
meaning of a sentence inferentially, I will criticize the use of formulas 
that are decorated with a force indicator. What is needed instead, I 
will argue, is a more general conception of logical inference that 
supplements verifiability with falsifiability, cf. (Wansing 2013, 2015). 
Both kinds of inference can come in a direct and an indirect version, 
thereby giving rise to different kinds of assertion and denial. 
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Zhu Wei (Peking University)
On the Correspondence between Denial and Assertion in Belief 
Revision Context
In classical equivalence of denial, to deny a sentence 'p' is equivalent 
to asserting 'not p'. In belief revision context, on the one hand to 
make a denial can be treated as an operation that 'contracts' a belief 
proposition ('p', for example) from a set of beliefs ('A', for example), 
which represent the epistemic/mind state of an agent. On the other 
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hand, to make an assertion can be regarded an operation that 
'expands' a set of beliefs by one more belief proposition. If the 
classical equivalence of denial held also in belief revision theory, then, 
we should probably admit that to deny belief 'p' by introducing 'not p' 
into the belief set 'A' is equivalent to exclude 'p' from the same belief 
set. However, in belief revision theory such an equivalence can hardly 
be accepted - or it is at least insufficient in order to properly 
understand the epistemic relationship between denial and assertion. 
In my presentation I would like to discuss why in the belief revision 
context the classical equivalence cannot hold and what other kind of 
systematic correspondence assertion and denial have. 
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